Wikileak materials on North Korea-Mongolia altered

One of the materials released by Wikileaks touches issue between North Korea and Mongolia. The document concerning meeting between Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mongolia and North Korean Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs held in Aug, 2009 by US Embassy was put on the Wikileaks on 29 Nov, 2010. However, the document was altered a few days later or on 01 Dec and some names of persons and letters were marked with xxxxxxxx.

By research unit of mongolianviews.com
See below for altered and original version of the document.

ORIGINAL
O 130854Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2981
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
Thursday, 13 August 2009, 08:54
S E C R E T ULAANBAATAR 000234
STATE FOR EAP/CM AND EAP/K; NSC FOR JEFF BADER
EO 12958 DECL: 08/13/2034
TAGS PREL, PGOV, MOPS, KNNP, MG
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA’S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN
MINISTER KIM
Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b) and (d)
¶1. (S) Summary: On August 12, Mongolian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT) Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee briefed poloff on the annual Mongolia-DPRK consultations that concluded on August 11. MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar led the Mongolian side, and the North Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the consultation. Sukhee noted DPRK delegation head Vice Foreign Minister Kim Yong Il spent much time on the nuclear issue and little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations, that the recent travel of former President Clinton to Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks, that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks, and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End Summary.
¶2. (S) Poloff met with MFAT Deputy Director for Asian Affairs J. Sukhee on August 12 to discuss Mongolia’s annual bilateral consultations with the DPRK. Sukhee was present at the consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a diplomat since 1985. Sukhee was candid in his meetings with poloff, referring repeatedly and openly to his handwritten notes from the DPRK consultations.
-------------------------------------------
DPRK DELEGATION OFFERS NO CRITICISM OF U.S.
-------------------------------------------
¶3. (S) Sukhee indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation. Sukhee said the meetings were notable for several reasons: the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United States, and they criticized China and Russia “three or four times” for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 is Sukhee’s description to poloff of the DPRK’s statements during the course of the consultations:
----------------------------
DPRK VFM ON DENUCLEARIZATION
----------------------------
¶4. (S) VFM Kim said the DPRK is spending too much on weapons rather than on its children, but that the current reality dictates that they cannot get away from weapons for now. Kim said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could serve as an example. Kim stated the United States would not allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is committed to peace and denuclearization.
¶5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK’s place now, they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no reaction to the suggestion.
¶6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the United States and the DPRK to come up with a “common language,” a “non-aggression agreement,” and establishment of diplomatic relations. Kim stated if the sides can take such measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy, and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize thereafter.
¶7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent “provocations” (this is Sukhee’s word to poloff; another word may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong signal. Kim agreed that the DPRK must be careful and must build confidence. The Mongolians stated that even if one has peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative.
--------------------------------
ON BILATERAL TALKS WITH THE U.S.
--------------------------------
¶8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton’s recent travel to the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed because of President Clinton’s recent involvement in a personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension of President Clinton’s visit.
¶9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue (Sukhee described Kim as “enthusiastic” at this point), and he stated “there are no eternal enemies in this world.”
----------------------
ON THE SIX PARTY TALKS
----------------------
¶10. (S) Kim took a “very hard line” on the Six Party Talks according to Sukhee, stating that the DPRK will never return to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the United States during the talks, and that Russia and China ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States.
------------------------------------------
VFM KIM’S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT ELBEGDORJ
------------------------------------------
¶11. (S) Sukhee also provided insight into Kim’s meeting with Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue “in the international arena.” Kim said to Elbegdorj, “We are telling you all this because Mongolia understand us.” Kim reiterated the notion that there is a “good personal understanding” between former President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il.
--------------------------------------
HOW ABOUT U.S.-DPRK TALKS IN MONGOLIA?
--------------------------------------
¶12. (S) Sukhee further noted that a counselor named Choi from the DPRK Embassy in Ulaanbaatar told Sukhee on the way to the airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that Kim offered no reaction. Choi also told Sukhee that the timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism whose organization the Mongols should spearhead.
MINTON

ALTERED

O 130854Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2981
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
<<220571>>
8/13/2009 8:54
09ULAANBAATAR234
Embassy Ulaanbaatar
SECRET

O 130854Z AUG 09
FM AMEMBASSY ULAANBAATAR
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2981
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIJING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
PACOM JIOC HONOLULU HI PRIORITY
SECDEF WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
NSC WASHINGTON DC PRIORITY
TAGS: PREL PGOV MOPS KNNP MG
SUBJECT: MONGOLIA"S CONSULTATIONS WITH DPRK VICE FOREIGN


S e c r e t ulaanbaatar 000234


State for eap/cm and eap/k; nsc for jeff bader

E.o. 12958: decl: 08/13/2034
Tags: prel, pgov, mops, knnp, mg
Subject: mongolia"s consultations with dprk vice foreign
minister kim

Classified By: Political Counselor Andrew K. Covington, Reasons 1.4 (b)
and (d)

¶1. (S) Summary: xxxxx. MFAT xxxxx led the Mongolian side, and the North
Koreans met with President Elbegdorj on the sidelines of the
consultation. xxxxx
little on the bilateral relationship with Mongolia. Key
themes on the part of the DPRK were the lack of criticism of
the United States, indications that the DPRK is seeking
bilateral talks with the USG on normalization of relations,
that the recent travel of former President Clinton to
Pyongyang has greatly improved the prospects for such talks,
that Mongolia would be an appropriate venue for these talks,
and that the Six Party Talks are no longer an option. End
Summary.

¶2. (S) xxxxx discuss Mongolia"s annual bilateral
consultations with the DPRK. xxxxx was present at the
consultations and has been involved with Korean affairs as a
diplomat since 1985. xxxxx was candid in his meetings with
poloff, referring repeatedly and xxxxx the DPRK consultations.

-------------------------------------------
dprk delegation offers no criticism of u.s.
-------------------------------------------

¶3. (S) xxxxx indicated that VFM Kim met with MFAT State
Secretary Tsogtbaatar for the consultations and also held a
separate meeting with President Elbegdorj on the margins
Monday. The Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister was to lead
this latter meeting but was unable due to an obligation.
xxxxx said the meetings were notable for several reasons:
the DPRK delegation did not read from a prepared script, they
were not aggressive and made no criticism of the United
States, and they criticized China and Russia "three or four
times" for supporting recent UN Resolutions aimed at the
DPRK. What follows in paras 4 through 12 xxxxx
description to poloff of the DPRK"s statements during the
course of the consultations:

----------------------------
dprk vfm on denuclearization
----------------------------

¶4. (S)xxxxx
said the DPRK is not a threat and was only interested in
self-protection. The Mongolian side expressed concern that a
nuclear DPRK could lead to a nuclear ROK, Japan, Syria, and
Iran, and urged that the Mongolian nuclear-free model could
serve as an example. xxxxx stated the United States would not
allow Japan or the ROK to go nuclear and that the DPRK is
committed to peace and denuclearization.

¶5. (S) The Mongolians offered the example of the Soviet Union
and the United States during the Reagan-Gorbachev era, when
the two allowed for nuclear inspections, leading to improved
trust and a reduction in the number of warheads. The
Mongolians stated that if they were in the DPRK"s place now,
they would allow inspections, which would lead to mutual
confidence and improved relations. The DPRK side offered no
reaction to the suggestion.

¶6. (S) The DPRK side said what is most important is for the
United States and the DPRK to come up with a "common
language," a "non-aggression agreement," and establishment of
diplomatic relations. xxxxx stated if the sides can take such
measures, then denuclearization will be possible and easy,
and that relations with Japan and the ROK will normalize
thereafter.

¶7. (S) The Mongolian side counseled that recent
"provocations"xxxxx; another word
may have been used in the consultations) such as the missile
test meant that the present situation was very fragile, and
that the DPRK should be careful not to present the wrong
signal. xxxxx The Mongolians stated that even if one has
peaceful intentions, one can be seen as provocative.

--------------------------------
on bilateral talks with the u.s.
--------------------------------

¶8. (S) Regarding former President Clinton"s recent travel to
the DPRK to secure of the release of the two journalists, Kim
said this action had been prepared for a long time, meaning
the groundwork for such a visit was already in place because
of the progress the United States and the DPRK made during
the Clinton presidency. Kim said forward motion stopped
during the Bush Administration but was now able to proceed
because of President Clinton"s recent involvement in a
personal capacity, because President Obama is of the same
party, and because former First Lady Clinton is now the
Secretary of State. The North Koreans were expecting a
dialogue with the United States to start soon as an extension
of President Clinton"s visit.

¶9. (S) Kim asked the Mongolians to support a U.S.-DPRK
dialogue xxxxx stated "there are no eternal enemies in this
world."

----------------------
on the six party talks
----------------------

¶10. (S) Kim took a "very hard line" on the Six Party Talks
according to xxxxx stating that the DPRK will never return
to the talks, that the talks were dead, but that the door has
not closed on an opportunity for negotiations. During
discussion of the Six Party Talks, Kim criticized Russia and
China for their support of recent UN resolutions aimed at the
DPRK. Kim said Japan and the ROK were natural allies of the
United States during the talks, and that Russia and China
ended up supporting the other three, so that the DPRK felt it
was five against one. Kim stated the real intention of the
Six Party Talks was to destroy the DPRK regime, and that at
present the DPRK wants to talk only to the United States.

------------------------------------------
vfm kim"s meeting with president elbegdorj
------------------------------------------

¶11. (S) xxxxx provided insight into Kim"s meeting with
Elbegdorj on August 10: Kim refrained from criticizing the
United States and stated the DPRK would be happy if the GOM
could support a U.S.-DPRK dialogue "in the international
arena." Kim said to Elbegdorj, "We are telling you all this
because Mongolia understand us." Kim reiterated the notion
that there is a "good personal understanding" between former
President Clinton and DPRK leader Kim Jong-Il.

--------------------------------------
how about u.s.-dprk talks in mongolia?
--------------------------------------

¶12. (S) xxxxx further noted that a xxxxx in Ulaanbaatar xxxxx on the way to the
airport on August 11 that he had suggested to VFM Kim that it
would be good to host U.S.-DPRK talks in Mongolia, but that
Kim offered no reaction.xxxxx that the
timing was right to establish a regional security mechanism
whose organization the Mongols should spearhead.


Minton